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Abstract 
Weaknesses in the grades and standards system in low-income countries across Sub-Saharan 
Africa undermine the transparency of agricultural markets. In the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Ghana and Mozambique rice is predominately sold in open bags and if rice price 
does not reflect its quality, then inefficiencies may lead to consumer welfare losses. 
Importantly, it is possible that impoverished communities are priced out of the market due to 
inflated and inefficient prices. The objective of this study is to examine determinates of rice 
price by estimating the impact of selected rice quality attributes on rice prices in DRC, Ghana 
and Mozambique. 
We collected 363 rice samples from open air markets in Bukavu (DRC), Nampula (Mozambique) 
and across Ghana in 2019. Each rice sample was analyzed in a food science lab for the quality 
attributes: percentage of chalk and brokens, chalk impact, length, and width. We used multiple 
regression analysis to estimate if and to what extent quality attributes were the drivers of price. 
Findings suggest that there are irregularities in the Ghanaian market for broken rice and that 
regardless of quality, imported rice is priced higher than domestic rice. In the DRC and 
Mozambique, our results indicate price is driven by length and width in the former and width in 
the latter. 
These results provide valuable insight to policy makers regarding the need for proper labeling 
and regulation of open bag rice sales in an effort to increase consumer welfare and improve 
food security.  
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1. Introduction  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, rice is increasingly becoming an important food crop (Kihoro et 
al., 2013; Muthayya et al., 2014). Unlike in Asia where the growing middle class is reducing its 
rice consumption, increased rice consumption is linked to economic development and 
urbanization across Africa (Nasrin et al., 2015). Although rice is the most important staple in the 
world, in terms of caloric intake, it is thinly traded on global markets. Only seven percent of 
total rice production is traded globally (“PS&D”, 2020). This is largely due to the fact that rice is 
mainly consumed where it is produced, and that rice is still a highly protected commodity. Strict 
import standards, including limits on the allowable percentage of broken kernels, standards on 
rice length and percentage of chalky kernels, can also limit trade if they do not closely reflect 
consumer preferences (Muthayya et al., 2014). High quality importation standards often drive 
up the price of rice and leave the poorest of the poor vulnerable to food insecurity. 
Our study considers the functionality of the open bag rice markets of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana and Mozambique. For this study, a market is considered 
functioning efficiently when rice price (1) is a function of its quality attributes, and (2) has the 
expected relationship with the quality attributes (e.g., negative relationship between price and 
percentage of broken kernels, etc.). We aim to estimate which, if any, quality attributes drive 
market pricing in the open air markets. This study provides a unique perspective on rice in Sub-
Saharan Africa because these three countries represent distinct rice policies and socio-political 
contexts. All three countries are quickly growing in both population and rice consumption. 
Sparse literature documents how quality affects rice price in Ghana, and no studies have been 
conducted for Mozambique and DRC to our knowledge. Unlike Asia, where rice has been 
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engrained in daily culture for centuries, rice preferences in Africa are still evolving; specifically 
as higher quality, imported rice is flooding the continent. Thus, understanding what consumers 
value is of importance for plant breeders, food security experts, governments and food 
importers. Rice traders and governments that impose strict import standards on broken rice 
percentage, as in Nigeria and Haiti, only limits rice consumption to the upper class because such 
high-quality rice is expensive. This study investigates how markets in three African countries are 
pricing lower quality (higher chalk and broken percentages (Fitzgerald and Resurreccion, 2009)) 
rice based on its attributes (see the Appendix for rice quality details). If low quality rice is priced 
accordingly this could signal that consumers can differentiate quality attributes and import 
standards could be lowered.  
 Beyond market motivations, this study also has environmental implications. Irrigated 
paddy rice is a water-intensive crop, accounting for approximately 25% of total global annual 
freshwater usage (Dobermann, 2012). Growing 1 kg of rice, on average, takes two to three 
times more water than other cereal grain crops (Tuong et al., 2005; Grassi et al., 2009). Given 
that two-thirds of the global population are now confronting water scarcity (Mekonnen and 
Hoekstra, 2016), and the fact that rice uses such large amounts of water, it is environmentally 
important that all rice goes to human consumption and not to an alternative use. In the U.S. for 
instance, it is common to use lower quality rice for pet food, thus the water-intensive rice crop 
does not make it to its intended market. Market pricing and consumer preferences across 
Africa need further examination to prevent “sub-quality” rice from entering the non-human 
food chain if low-income countries globally are willing to consume it. A large concern across 
Africa is the lack of standards and monitoring of open bag markets where there could be 
 3 
incentives for wholesalers and merchants to mix high and low quality rice and sell it at high 
quality prices. If markets do not work efficiently, the presence of low quality rice could erode 
the market value for high quality rice and cause market failure.  
This study addresses several important questions related to rice markets in the DRC, 
Ghana and Mozambique. First, this study examines the efficiency of rice markets. Efficient rice 
markets are those where quality attributes are reflected properly in rice prices. A functioning 
market matches the preferences of consumers with the quality and price of products; 
therefore, quality attributes consumers’ desire, such as lower levels of brokenness and shape 
(e.g., length and width), should drive price in a functioning rice market. The open-air bag style 
markets across Africa make it difficult to visually determine rice quality because of the lack of 
labeling and quality assurance. Thus, the first goal is to assess whether prices reflect actual 
quality. The innate difficulty  for consumers to visually assess the quality of the rice in open 
bags, which is not labeled at a market, can lead to market failures. Quality attributes like 
percentage broken and percentage chalk are very difficult to assess for even expert eyes. 
Inefficient markets can lead to inflated rice prices because the discounts for lower quality are 
most likely not being accounted for correctly. The inflated prices push the poor out of the 
market, making them unable to express their demand and participate in the market. This has 
obvious food insecurity implications as the urban rich often drive rice markets in many low-
income countries (Demont et al., 2013). 
 If markets are working efficiently, consumer preferences can be efficiently expressed. 
Thus, the second goal of this study is to determine which quality attributes are the major 
drivers of price in each country. While this study does not specifically estimate willingness-to-
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pay (WTP), it does use the proxy of availability of various qualities of rice in markets as a signal 
that demand exists. By assuming in a functioning market that quality and price will match 
consumers preference, we can determine which quality attributes are valued by consumers 
based on availability and price in the open bag market.  
Our primary attribute of interest is the percentage of broken rice. If consumers indicate  
indifference to brokens (proxied by insignificant or minimal price impacts), then there is an 
opportunity to segment the market accordingly. Offering more choices for percentage of 
broken rice allows consumers to purchase the rice that best meets their preferences and as 
importantly for food security in Africa – their budgets. Segmenting the market allows 
consumers to spend what they are willing and able to cover their rice demand. Nutritionally 
speaking, broken and whole kernels are nearly identical and have the same starch and protein 
content (Wang et al., 2002). If it is found that brokens play no role in rice price then it provides 
important evidence that brokens should not be a constraint to importation. 
Rice exporting countries will benefit from this study in three aspects. First, knowing the 
quality attributes that drive price across the three countries allows exporters to send the rice 
with specific attributes to specific countries. Secondly, broken rice can be sold at a higher price 
if consumers are indifferent to percent broken, which can increase the revenue exporters get 
from broken rice that would otherwise be sold as 100% broken rice for human consumption, or 
for non-consumption uses (e.g., pet food or brewing). Increasing the percent of broken rice 
exported could be particularly helpful for large Asian rice exporters, such as Thailand and India, 
with a significant presence in these African markets and large volumes of broken rice available. 
To illustrate, India and Thailand exported an average of 11 and 9 million metric tons of 100% 
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broken rice a year in the period 2015-2019 (“UN COMTRADE”, 2020), some of which could be 
sold at a higher price to consumers indifferent about percent broken. Lastly, rice demand can 
increase as the market matches more closely the preferences of consumers, including those 
potentially priced out of the market due to inefficient pricing. 
Our study is unique because it takes the qualitative attributes of rice for consumers and 
systematically quantifies them through analysis in a food science rice lab. We specifically 
consider quality attributes that can be seen visually (search variables: brokens, chalkiness, 
length, and width) rather than physicochemical (amylose, texture, stickiness, etc.) attributes 
that cannot be determined without advanced analysis. This research gives insight into a rapidly 
growing staple crop in three rapidly growing countries. There is little in the way of previous rice 
attribute studies in Mozambique and DRC and while literature does exist for the Ghanaian 
market it does not specifically address the drivers of rice price (see the Appendix for country 
details). This study can benefit rice exporters, rice policy makers, food security advocates, rice 
scientists and rice consumers by exploring what attributes drive rice price in each respective 
country.  
2. Methodology 
2.1. Hedonic Price Model 
Hedonic pricing assumes that the demand for goods is derived from the demand for 
specific attributes, or similarly, that a product is a basket of attributes, each contributing to the 
product’s market price. Hedonic price models are rooted in Lancaster theory of demand that 
states that a product can be described as a bundle of characteristics or attributes (Lancaster, 
1971). Consumers choose which product to buy based on the bundle of attributes embedded in 
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the product, and the price they pay is considered the revealed WTP for a product (Lusk and 
Shogren, 2007). Formally, we define the hedonic price model as: 
𝑃! = ∑ 𝛼"𝑋",!" + 𝜀!                                                             (1) 
where 𝑃!  is the market price for rice type 𝑖, 𝑋",!  is vector of selected quality variables 𝑘 for rice 
type 𝑖, 𝛼"is a vector of parameters, and 𝜀!  is the error term.  
2.2. Data 
Long grain non-fragrant rice samples were collected from ten markets across Bukavu, 
DRC (the sixth largest city in DRC and the capital of South Kivu province) in the summer of 2019. 
A total of 101 samples (each roughly 100 g) were purchased in open-air markets by the same 
participant who purchased the rice at all the markets in Swahili. At the point of purchase the 
price of the rice, in Congolese Franc (CDF), was recorded along with the weight of the rice (so 
we could standardize price per kg, as rice in DRC is sold in open bags and distributed by 
scooping cups of various sizes into a bag). All the collected samples were imported to DRC and 
non-parboiled.  
Long grain non-fragrant rice samples were collected from nine markets across Nampula, 
Mozambique (the third largest city in Mozambique and capital of the Nampula province) in the 
summer of 2019. 112 samples (roughly 100 g) were purchased in open-air markets by the same 
participant who purchased the rice at all markets in either Portuguese or Makua (the local tribal 
language). Prices per kg were labeled on/in each bag in Mozambican metical (MZN) which the 
data collector noted with each sample. Like the DRC samples, all the collected samples were 
imported and non-parboiled. 
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Long grain non-fragrant rice samples were collected from 14 markets across Ghana (10 
clustered around Accra and four in northern Ghana) between July and August of 2019. A total 
of 150 samples were collected. The majority of the transactions were done in the Akan dialect, 
with a few in English. Local units such as “olonka”, "American tin cup", or "margarine tin" were 
used in purchasing each sample. These local units consist of empty cans or plastic containers 
with varying sizes that reflects the price, which was known prior to the purchase through 
signage. Similar to the DRC samples, in Ghana prices were determined by container size. 
Subsequently, the per kg price at which the samples were bought were calculated as the 
quotient of its purchase price divided by its kg equivalence determined with an electronic 
weighing scale. Each sample was also labeled as imported or domestic and parboiled or non-
parboiled.  
In each of the three countries there was no negotiation in price, as the price for each 
type of rice in each location was delineated with signage. Prices in Mozambique were labeled 
per kg, in DRC and Ghana it was labeled by scoop (of various sizes which necessitated weighing 
each sample to get its per kg price). As is common in many African open market some vendors 
may put more rice the top of the premeasured cup (mitigated by the weighing and 
standardizing of each sample) but this was not negotiated and each sample was purchased at 
its per scoop value. While bargaining is common in many African markets, its less prevalent 
when prices are labeled. While not attempted for the reasons listed above, if bargaining did 
take place it was our a priori expectation that the relative difference in “bargained” prices 
would be equivalent to the labeled prices.  
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A potential criticism of the sampling by convenience method employed in this study is 
that the samples collected may not represent what consumers are actually buying and the price 
they pay since prices and quantities purchased by consumers were not observed. That is, 
consumers in one city may buy the majority of their rice from one vendor and it may be one 
specific type of rice. In an attempt to mitigate this we purchased rice from multiple vendors in 
each market and went to several markets in each of the focus areas. Further, given that rice 
price was labeled and negotiation not common, we approximately know what consumers 
would pay if they purchased each type of rice. The explicit goal of the study is not to estimate 
the WTP for rice but rather determine which, if any, quality attributes drive the price of rice 
that vendors charge.  
All rice samples were analyzed in the Rice Processing Lab at the University of Arkansas. 
The SeedCount Image Analysis System, which is manufactured by Next Instruments (“Next 
Instruments”, 2020), was used to analyze each of the individual samples. From each sample, we 
used a random 20 grams to estimate various quality attributes. The SeedCount method used 
this 20-gram sample to create a sub-sample for processing a 500-kernel sample and employed a 
flatbed scanner to create a digital image of each individual rice kernel. Kernel-by-kernel data 
was taken for each of the 500-kernel samples and then aggregated for an average score per 
sample. The SeedCount terminal setup uses a tray with individual slots for each of the 500-
kernel sample with half of the kernels laying horizontally, allowing for a width measurement, 
and the other half laying vertically to measure length.  
The SeedCount image analysis software uses a comparison of each kernels length with 
the average sample length to determine broken percentage (defined as less than three-fourths 
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the sample average length). Broken and head (whole kernel) rice are the result of milling the 
hull and bran from the rough rice. Percentage broken is thus measured as the percent weight of 
a rice sample less than three-fourths the average sample length relative to the original rough, 
unmilled rice weight (see the Appendix for further details on rice quality measurements). 
Chalky areas in rice grains, the opaque white parts of the grains, are deemed, generally, to 
represent poor quality in many rice market segments and thus can result in lower prices and 
demand (Fitzgerald and Resurreccion, 2009). Chalky areas in rice grains are caused by loose 
packing or incomplete filling of starch granules (Singh et al., 2003) . SeedCount further 
quantifies rice chalkiness for each sample as chalk impact (rated from 0-100). Thus, from the 
SeedCount results we could quantify many of the search attributes deemed important for 
consumers in the three target countries; width, length, percent broken and chalkiness for each 
of the 363 total rice samples. Although cleanliness has been cited as a relevant search attribute 
in Ghana (Sedem et al., 2017), and may likely be a relevant attribute in DRC and Mozambique, 
the overwhelming majority of the rice samples collected in the three countries were clean, 
which led us to exclude cleanliness from the model due to lack of data. 
2.3. Empirical Model 
The variables included in all three datasets were identified as: length (mm), width (mm), 
length-to-width ratio, percent broken, percent chalky, and chalk impact (ranging from 0 to 100). 
Using available variables, multiple regression analysis was used to estimate the impact of each 
quality attribute on the observed price. We used a log-log model so that the coefficients could 
be interpreted as elasticities to determine relative importance of quality attributes for 
determining rice prices. Seven models, consisting of different combinations of the independent 
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variables, were estimated for each of the five scenarios: 1) Ghana total, 2) Ghana imported, 3) 
Ghana domestic, 4) DRC total and 5) Mozambique total, giving a total of 35 models estimated 
which are available in the Appendix. The same models were run for each country to allow for 
comparison. The models estimated for each country show the consistency in significance level 
of relevant variables along with limited variability in significant coefficients. The models 
included variations of all available quality characteristics. The quality characteristics 
specifications and justifications are described below.  
While the human eye most realistically looks at rice kernels as a length-to-width ratio, 
by decomposing the commonly used length-to-width ratio into its parts we can capture 
whether a specific attribute is driving the price. That being said, all models were estimated 
using both length and width as well as the length-to-width ratio.  
Chalk has several definitions in the international market. There are differences between 
percent chalky kernels (which is used as the metric of grading in the U.S.) and chalk impact 
(which we use in this study). The U.S. rice quality standard defines a chalk kernel as one with 
one-half or more of its area chalky. The percentage of chalk rice in a sample is the percentage 
weight of chalk kernels over the total weight of the sample. Chalkiness as we define it in this 
study, using the chalk impact measure, is the total area of a sample which is chalky. Assume 
there were 100 kernels of rice and every kernel was forty percent chalky. According to the U.S. 
rice standard, this would result in a sample being zero percent chalky as every kernel in the 
sample is under the threshold of fifty percent. Under our definition, this sample would be 40 
percent chalky because it is total area with no thresholds. Our measurement also has flaws, if 
there were 10 kernels and 9 had zero chalk but one was 100 percent chalk our modeling would 
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say the sample is 10 percent chalky, although the other nine kernels are perfect. Chalk impact 
usually, though not always, gives a larger value of chalkiness. Regardless of which measure of 
chalkiness was used the results were similar. The zero values of chalk impact were replaced 
with a near zero number (1.0x10 -35 ) to allow for taking logs. The nature of our study requires 
analyzing a sample of a purchased sample, meaning a zero value of chalkiness from the lab 
analysis likely translates to a very low level of chalkiness in the open bag of rice available to 
consumers, that is not exactly zero. For this reason, we feel the replacement of zero’s in the 
data is a reasonable assumption.  
In Ghana, where parboiled rice is prevalent and has been shown to affect price we  
included a dummy variable for parboiled. Further, unlike in DRC and Mozambique where all 
samples were imported, Ghana had imported and domestic samples that were disaggregated 
into their own regression. Because previous literature has found that Ghanaians prefer 
imported to domestic rice, ceteris paribus, we wanted to test this hypothesis by estimating 
domestic and imported rice separately. By running three separate models by country (and two 
for domestic and imported rice in Ghana), rather than including fixed effects dummies, we 
allow flexibility of each quality attribute to vary by country.  
Fixed effects for markets were tested in each country (shown in Appendix). The 
significance of the market binary variables varied by country, but the coefficients of the quality 
attributes remained largely unchanged after the inclusion of market fixed effects. Including the 
market fixed effects, ranging from nine to 14 markets, decreased degrees of freedom without 
providing any new insights. It would stand to reason that rice is more homogeneous in quality 
attributes within a market as opposed to across markets, as vendors in a market may purchase 
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from the same wholesalers. If this is the case then the market fixed effects could be capturing 
some of the explanatory power of the rice quality variables. As such, we pooled all markets 
together, by country, in the preferred model. Unlike the DRC and Mozambique, where samples 
were collected within the same city, in Ghana samples were collected in and around Accra as 
well as the North of the country. To account for spatial preferences or transportation cost 
differences, each model for Ghana included a locational  fixed effect for Accra or “other”.  
The preferred model was selected based on the above justifications, while also 
considering adjusted R2 and  AIC comparisons. Of the five scenarios without markets, consisting 
of Ghana total, Ghana imported, Ghana domestic, DRC total, and Mozambique total, the 
preferred model provided the highest R2  in four out of the five models. The consistency in our 
preferred model across the countries in this study allows for comparison of elasticities. The 
preferred model for DRC and Mozambique is as follows: 
log(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) = 𝛽$ + 𝛽% log(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛) + 𝛽& log(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽' log(𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)																		(2)
+ 𝛽( log(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑘	𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) + 𝜀 
And the following equation for Ghana: 
log(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) = 𝛽$ + 𝛽% log(𝐵𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛) + 𝛽& log(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ) + 𝛽' log(𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ)																		(3)
+ 𝛽( log(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑙𝑘	𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽)𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀 
After the preferred model was estimated, the results for each country were tested for 
homoscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test. If the model was found to be heteroscedastic, 
the heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix was estimated using HC3 as in Long and 
Ervin (Long and Ervin, 2000) due to our small sample size. Robust standard errors from HC3 
correction were obtained using R version 4.0.2 and the sandwich package and the lmtest 
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package (Zeileis, 2004; Zeileis and Hothorn, 2002). Models were also checked for 
multicollinearity, given the relationship between brokenness and chalkiness, using the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) function in the car package in R. None of our models indicated 
multicollinearity, defined as having a VIF above a threshold of ten. Additionally, the data was 
examined for breakpoints in the brokenness variable slope using piecewise linear regression 
and breakpoint analysis. This would reveal any thresholds of significance in brokenness, for 
example revealing that brokens are only significant above 15%. The analysis was done using the 
segmented function in the segmented package in R. However, no significant breakpoints or 
thresholds were identified indicating that rice price and broken percentage had a linear 
relationship.  
3. Results  
Summary statistics for the quality attributes found through the SeedCount analysis are 
presented in Table 1. The absolute differences in maximums and minimums for length and 
width appear to be relatively small, but this is due to the physiological properties of long grain 
rice, a kernel can only get so long and so wide. That being said, the relative differences between 
the maximum and minimums ranged from 12 to 35 percent. On average, the Mozambican 
sample had the largest kernel length at 7.01 mm and domestic Ghanaian sample had the largest 
width at 2.49 mm. There is greater variation in both the measure of chalkiness and percent 
broken kernels. The lowest broken percentage was zero from a domestic Ghanaian sample and 
the highest was 40.4% from an imported Ghanaian sample. Chalkiness ranged from zero in both 
a Ghanaian domestic and imported sample to 85.48 in a domestic Ghanaian sample. On 
average the Ghanaian domestic rice was of lower quality in all categories (shorter, more chalky, 
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and with more broken)  besides kernel width. This result is consistent with previous studies 
(Ayeduvor, 2018, 2020; Demont et al., 2013), which found that Ghanaian rice was of lower 
quality relative to imported rice.  
Table 1. Summary statistics for quality attributes  







Price (USD)*      
Min 0.59 0.49 0.37 0.37 0.56 
Mean 0.79a 0.67b 1.03c 0.97d 1.06cd 
Max 1.34 0.98 2.04 1.91 2.04 
      
Length (mm)           
Min 5.88 5.77 5.69 6.08 5.69 
Mean 6.87a 7.01b 6.86a 6.71c 6.94ab 
Max 7.56 7.6 7.73 7.36 7.73 
            
Width (mm)           
Min 2.2 2.19 2.13 2.23 2.13 
Mean 2.29a 2.32b 2.37c 2.49d 2.29a 
Max 2.47 2.6 2.61 2.61 2.58 
            
Broken (%)           
Min 0.5 1.5 0.3 0 0.3 
Mean 8.77a 7.3b 8.81ab 13.31ab 9.05ab 
Max 19.2 22.5 40.4 26.9 40.4 
            
Chalk Impact (0-100)           
Min 0.49 0.18 0 0 0 
Mean 3.7a 3.5a 6.98b 15.25c 2.32d 
Max 10.1 27.83 85.48 85.48 15.1 
            
Observations 101 112 150 54 96 
2018 Per Capita  
Rice Consumption (kg) 29.7** 31.5*** 47.8*** - - 
*Exchange rate as of June 2, 2020.  
**(“Helgi Library”, 2020). 
***(Durand-Morat and Chavez, 2019).  
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3.1. Quality Impacts  
3.1.1. Percentage of Brokens  
We find that in Ghana (both in domestic and imported rice) and Mozambique increased 
brokens reduce rice price. In Mozambique a 1% increase in brokens would reduce price by 
0.094% (P <0.01) (Table 2). To put this in perspective, the difference between the maximum 
and minimum percentage of broken rice in the Mozambique rice samples was 21% (Table 1). 
This difference coupled with the estimated impact of brokens on price would suggest that there 
would be a price difference of 1.95%, a small difference given any definition. This would suggest 
that consumers don’t care about brokens, and as such vendors don’t adjust price for broken 
quantity. Alternatively, there is a market failure and because consumers can’t differentiate 
between samples with different percentages of brokens, rice vendors take advantage of this. 
This result could suggest that rice may not be priced according to its percent brokens, 
considering the Mozambican government stated the grading and standardization system in 
Mozambique for rice is weak (“Republic of Mozambique”, 2009). Further research is warranted 
in Mozambique to determine if consumers really do not discount broken rice (at a high 
percentage) or vendors are not pricing rice according to the broken percentage it contains. In 
the current markets, there appears to be little incentive for the rice supply chain to improve 
rice quality by reducing broken rice because either consumers are insensitive to percentage 
broken or the market is not providing a premium. 
  
 16 
Table 2 Impact of Rice Quality Variables on Price  
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
 
A similar story unfolds in Ghana (total sample) where the difference between maximum 
and minimum percentage of brokens is 40.1% (Table 1) and the estimated coefficient on broken 
rice is -0.082 (P<0.01) resulting in a difference in rice price of only 3.28%. Unlike Mozambique, 
there is existing literature on Ghanaian consumer preferences and broken rice has been found 
to be discounted (Demont et al., 2013; Demont and Rizzotto, 2012; Sedem et al., 2017). Our 
results suggest that vendors are either: (1) not pricing rice according to the percentage broken, 
or (2) they simply do not know the percentage broken and thus price all visually similar rice 
equally. Asante (2013) interviewed 206 Ghanaian consumers about rice preference and 20% 
and 39% listed percentage of broken grains as either very important or important, respectively 
(out of four Likert categories, only 14% said it was not important). This seems to indicate the 































































      
R2 0.279   0.416 0.304   0.363 0.233  
Observations 101 112 150 96 54 
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existence of some market inefficiencies, either from a rent seeking standpoint or simply from 
the supply chain not preserving the milling information.    
The DRC estimates indicate that price was not a function (P>0.1) of broken rice. Like 
Mozambique this warrants further research on consumer preferences as there has not been a 
consumer preference study on rice quality attributes in DRC. Our results indicate that either 
consumers are indifferent to broken rice percentage or markets are simply not pricing rice 
accordingly. It would seem unlikely that consumers would be indifferent given the high 
difference in maximum and minimum of brokens in our sample period with the lack of market 
standards. If consumers were truly indifferent, it would be more profitable for vendors to sell 
higher amounts of brokens, ceteris paribus, as they cost less to source.  
3.1.2. Grain Chalkiness  
Chalk was not found to affect price (P>0.1) in Ghana for all samples (domestic, imported 
and the pooled sample). This is an interesting result as Ghana had the highest average and 
largest standard deviation of chalk (Table 1). Diving deeper however, imported rice in Ghana 
had the lowest average chalk impact and a lower variance, indicating that given the low amount 
of chalk in imported rice and the fact that chalk values are consistently low and homogeneous 
across samples, the variation in chalk is not enough to warrant price changes. Conversely, 
domestic rice in Ghana had the highest chalk possibly indicating that domestic rice is simply 
priced as such, where imported rice may have differentiating price impacts (broken and length).  
In Mozambique chalk was found to negatively affect rice price, with a 1% increase in 
chalk resulting in a 0.065 percent decrease (Table 2) in price (P<0.05). The difference between 
the chalkiest average sample and the least in Mozambique was 27.65%, which would result in a 
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price difference of 1.79%. While seemingly small, it is often difficult for consumers to assess 
chalkiness. Both chalk definitions (percent chalky and chalkiness) were modeled and chalkiness 
as we define it produced more robust results, having more statistical power with similar 
coefficients. Regardless of definition, it appears that chalk, while significant, is either not being 
priced correctly or is simply not a large factor in rice price in Mozambique.  
Chalk in the DRC samples had the lowest variance, lowest maximum and relatively small 
mean. That being said, chalk was found statistically significant (P<0.01) with a one percent 
increase in chalk resulting in an increase in price of 0.049%. While this result is counterintuitive 
the difference between the largest and smallest average chalk sample in DRC was 9.61% 
resulting in a price difference of 0.47% in price. Given the low variance and low mean chalk 
value it is likely that rice vendors simply cannot visually differentiate the “best” from the 
“worst” sample with regards to chalk. More research is warranted based on this result to see if 
vendors would price accordingly when the variance increases.  
3.1.3. Kernel Length and Width 
When the Ghanaian samples are disaggregated, it was found that neither length nor 
width affected the price of domestic rice, and only length affected the price of imported rice, 
with longer kernels being priced at a premium (Table 2). One hypothesis on why domestic rice 
price is not a function of length or width while imported rice price is could be that imported rice 
is seen as superior to domestic rice and consumers are more selective when purchasing. The 
difference between the longest and shortest average sample grain length for imported rice in 
Ghana was 35.85% (Table 1) which would result in a price difference of 49.58 (P<0.05) percent.  
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Interestingly, in Mozambique width was found to affect price with a 1% increase in 
width leading to a 2.4% in price (P<0.01) but price was not found to be a function of length. The 
difference between the largest average width sample collected in Mozambique and the 
smallest average width sample was 18.72%. Using the estimated coefficient from Table 2 would 
result in a price difference of 43.79%, ceteris paribus.  
In DRC, it was found that rice price is both a function of length and width with wider and 
longer kernels being priced at a premium. The difference between the average longest and 
shortest kernel length samples from DRC was 28.5% (7.56 and 5.88 mm, respectively). Given 
this and the length coefficient of 1.362 (P<0.01) the difference in the price of the above 
samples is estimated to be 38.8%, ceteris paribus. A similar story is found for the effects of 
width on rice price in DRC where the difference between the largest and smallest average 
sample was found to be 12.2% (2.47 and 2.2 mm, respectively), which would result in an 
estimated price difference of 23.2%, using the width coefficient of 1.902 (P<0.01).  
3.2 Value Heterogeneity across African Countries   
Having looked at differences between the three countries on an attribute level, we also 
considered the absolute difference in price on a holistic level for a rice sample sold in each of 
the three countries. Figure 1 shows the percent difference in price if the average quality of rice 
in one country was sold in another. The average sample is defined as the mean of the quality 
attributes from each country. The preferred model for each country, in Table 2, was used to 
calculate the average log price. The parboiled data in Ghana was not used in the percent 
difference calculation in DRC and Mozambique. Zero was used as the average of the parboiled 
quality attribute for DRC and Mozambique in Ghana. Considering most of the rice imported to 
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DRC, Mozambique, and Ghana is of similar quality (Table 1), the statistical difference in price 
can largely be attributed to difference in preferences in each country. This highlights how rice is 
not a homogeneous commodity in that countries value the same sample differently. We should 
note these differences in price do not include any transportations costs. Therefore the 
difference in price should not be viewed as an opportunity for arbitrage, but instead as an 
illustration of the contribution of each quality attribute to the price in different markets.  
 
Figure 1 Percentage Difference in Value of Average Quality Rice Sold in Alternative Countries. 
3.2.1. Democratic Republic of the Congo 
In DRC, the average sample of Mozambique rice would be valued 0.63% higher than the 
average sample of DRC rice. The rice from Mozambique has higher average length and width 
than the rice from DRC, so the higher valuation is congruent with the previously discussed 
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results. The average of all rice, domestic and imported, from Ghana is valued 3.62% less than 
average DRC rice in a DRC market. The average of rice imported to Ghana is valued at 4.42% 
less than the average sample of DRC rice. While the average sample of domestic Ghanaian rice 
is valued at 2.2% less than the DRC average sample. In DRC, domestic Ghanaian rice would be 
valued higher than rice imported to Ghana. The domestic rice grown in Ghana is on average 
longer and wider than the imported rice with higher levels of chalkiness and brokens. Because 
brokens and chalkiness are not heavily discounted in DRC, the preference for Ghana’s domestic 
rice confirms our previous results.  
3.2.2. Mozambique 
In Mozambique, the average sample of rice from DRC would be worth 1.93% less than 
the average sample of rice from Mozambique. DRC rice is valued lower than the Mozambican 
rice in Mozambique for the same reason Mozambican rice was valued higher in DRC. Both 
countries have similar levels of chalkiness while Mozambique has the higher average width of 
rice kernels. The average sample of all rice from Ghana would be worth 12.07% more than the 
average sample of Mozambican rice. The average rice sample imported to Ghana would be 
worth 11.13% more than the average of Mozambican rice. The average sample of domestic 
Ghanaian rice would be worth 13.74% more than the average Mozambican rice sample sold in 
Mozambique. Again, the domestic rice from Ghana is valued higher than rice that is imported to 
Ghana.  
3.2.3. Ghana 
For Ghana the baseline is the average sample of all rice in Ghana, including both 
domestic and imported rice. The average sample of DRC rice sold in Ghana would be worth 
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1.04% more than average sample of Ghanaian rice. The average Mozambican sample of rice 
would be worth 5.92% more than the average sample of total rice in Ghana. The average 
sample of rice imported to Ghana would be worth 2.19% more than the average sample of total 
rice in Ghana. Compared to the average domestic rice sample which is valued at 3.89% less 
than the average sample of total rice in Ghana. In contrast with DRC and Mozambique, the rice 
imported into Ghana is valued higher than domestic rice. Among the three countries involved in 
this study, the preference for the rice imported to Ghana over domestic Ghanaian rice, when 
considering the average sample, is unique to Ghana but congruent with previous findings.   
 Although parboiled rice is a value-added attribute, it was found to decrease price for 
both imported (P<0.01) and domestic (P<0.05) rice. Results from Table 2 indicate that, ceteris 
paribus, domestic parboiled rice sells for 28% less than non-parboiled and imported parboiled 
sells for 35.3% less than non-parboiled imported rice. These results are consistent with previous 
literature (Taylor and Archibald, 2019; Tomlins et al., 2005) on Ghanaian consumer demand 
where it was found that although consumers perceived parboiled rice to have higher nutritional 
qualities (and thus often preferred by local governments), it is less preferred by most 
consumers due to perceived poor quality of domestic parboiled rice.  
For every specification, the directional fixed effect for Ghanaian markets was insignificant 
(Table 3). The robust insignificance, across seven model specifications, would seem to indicate 
that the region of purchase in Ghana does not significantly influence price.   
  
 23 
Table 3 Ghanaian Locational (Accra and Outside of Accra) Models 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 








































































































        
R2 0.262 0.257 0.296 0.260 0.255 0.298 0.307 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
 
 
4. Discussion  
Rice is an important staple food globally and is increasingly important across Sub-
Saharan Africa. Functioning markets and pricing of commodities are key tools for promoting 
food security for the most vulnerable populations. Our study provides critical insights into how 
quality affects rice prices in DRC, Mozambique and Ghana as well as revealed areas for future 
analysis. One of the main findings of this study is that each country seems to have distinctive 
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pricing differences for quality attributes. Even if countries price certain quality attributes 
positively the magnitude can be drastically different. This highlights the fact that rice price can 
vary greatly based on small quality differences and should be priced based on specific quality 
attributes. The results of broken rice impacts on prices are thought-provoking because they 
demonstrate the likelihood of market failures in Ghana, and simultaneously generate deeper 
questions about consumer preferences in Mozambique and DRC. There is extensive, non-
hypothetical literature on Ghanaian consumer preference for non-broken rice yet there the 
estimated discount for brokenness is minimal. Our study would seem to suggest that vendors in 
Ghana are not pricing rice based on these stated preferences. The range of percent brokens in 
Ghanaian samples (40.1%) and the estimated small impact (3.28%) suggests one of two market 
failures.  
First, vendors simply may not be aware of the percentage of brokens in the rice they are 
selling. While initial importers would have to be aware of this percentage because they pay 
exporters based on this, the supply chain may be breaking down prior to the final sale to 
consumers. This could be due to mixing of open bags or mixing of different rice types. The 
second potential market failure may be the fact that vendors are aware of broken percentages 
but are aware that consumers cannot visually assess differences and thus do not discount rice 
prices accordingly. Regardless of the type of market failure illustrated in our results (reinforced 
by previous literature on Ghanaian rice preferences), the findings indicate a compelling need 
for increased grading and standards at the final point of sale. Further segmentation of rice by 
percent broken could increase total welfare, if consumer welfare increases more than vendor 
welfare decreases, and specifically improve the purchasing ability of lower income people. Still, 
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it should be noted that the cost of implementing regulated standards could lead to increased 
price of all rice, regardless of quality. Even if regulated standards reduce the price of low quality 
rice, the cost of implementation and monitoring could again increase the price of the low 
quality rice leading to ambiguous impacts on welfare. In the case of inefficient markets, 
standards should be introduced with continual monitoring to avoid unintended decreases in 
welfare among the low-income group. Further research is warranted to see if consumer WTP 
would warrant standards for open bag rice markets and what, if any, of the additional 
regulation costs would be split between consumers and vendors.  Future research is also 
needed to help understand these results better, such as conducting consumer preference 
studies that would allow for comparison of the pricing behavior by vendors with what 
consumers’ revealed preferences for selected rice quality attributes are. 
We provide a first empirical examination of rice price response to quality attributes, 
finding relatively small impacts of brokens on rice price. Given the fact that the Mozambican 
government stated the grading and standardization system in Mozambique for rice is weak, and 
is yet to become an important tool for both domestic [rice] production and consumption, one 
of two things become apparent. Our results indicate either consumers do not value whole rice 
and are not willing-to-pay a premium (we find a premium but it’s not a large factor), or the lack 
of standards and grading has led to a market failure. Given the large range of broken rice in the 
Mozambican sample (21 percent) and its small estimated impact, our results would at the least 
suggest a market failure in labeling and pricing to some degree. If consumers did not care about 
broken rice, then the mean of all samples should be higher than 3.5%, which is low by 
international standards as broken rice is sustainably cheaper to purchase on the international 
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market. In a relative context, Lyman et al. (2013) found that broken rice is priced at 40% below 
head rice (whole kernels) and as such we should see a 9.2% (40 percent multiplied by 21 
percent) difference between the max and the min brokens in Mozambique.  
One potential argument for the small, relative price differences amongst quality 
attributes is that consumers cannot visually differentiate marginal differences (say the 
difference between 15 and 25 percent brokens). One explanation is simply that consumers 
don’t demand higher quality rice and that sellers thus do not take these characteristics into 
pricing. That being said, all the quality attributes in this study directly affect the cooking and 
texture of rice once prepared. Thus, another possible scenario is that consumers can’t visually 
differentiate marginal differences in quality but value them after preparation is complete. All 
this being said, if consumers truly did not value quality attributes such as broken and chalky rice 
we should have seen a much higher volume of broken and chalky rice in the samples since rice 
vendors can source this much cheaper on the international market. This would seem to imply 
that consumers do value these quality attributes but have a difficult time delineating them in 
an open bag setting.  
The results of this study are important on two distinct fronts. First, because the rice 
culture (preferences) is not embedded in the fabric of most African countries (unlike Asia), 
market preferences are still developing. In some countries, such as Nigeria, rice 
traders/importers have proactively set high barriers to entry for rice quality which results in the 
urban middle and high classes to benefit from rice imports while the poor are priced out of the 
market (Lancon and Benz, 2007). Other countries, such as the DRC, Mozambique and Ghana, do 
not have quality import regulations yet and as such, consumers and not policymakers are 
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driving the market prices and their regulations (or lack of quality regulations). The potential for 
indifference, based on insignificance in DRC and minimal price discount in Mozambique, to 
brokens in Mozambique and DRC has important food security and importation implications. 
Since many countries where rice is embedded into their culture discount broken rice, there is 
often an excess supply of broken rice which leads it to be used in the pet food or brewing 
industries. If more markets accept broken (or at least a higher percentage of broken) rice, then 
a possibility exists to increase food security and input-use efficiency in a food security context 
(as rice uses a high volume of water). The results of this study can be used by rice importers and 
exporters who are trying to best segment the rice market in DRC, Mozambique and Ghana, and 
perhaps more broadly throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Most importantly, this study should be 
used as a spring board for future research focused on the potential of rice importers/exporters 
to segment rice with high percentage of brokens when serving the DRC and Mozambican 
markets. From a food security perspective, future research should use non-hypothetical 
experiments to determine what, if any, thresholds consumers would value for broken rice in 
Mozambique and DRC, two of Africa’s fastest growing countries.  
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6.  Appendix 
6.1. Rice Quality 
Rice is distinct from other row crops because it is a field-to-plate crop, meaning the 
product eaten by consumers is typically the full rice kernel rather than a processed product, like 
flour (unlike maize, wheat and soybeans, which are typically more heavily processed). So, in 
rice, quality, specifically appearance, is of importance to consumers. The remainder of this 
section will describe the visually quality traits we consider in this study beginning with rice 
brokenness then moving to rice chalkiness and finishing with kernel length and width.  
6.1.1. Broken Rice  
After the hull and bran have been removed, the resulting mass is milled rice, which is 
then separated into brokens and head rice. As an illustrative example, if 100 kg of clean rice 
were delivered to a mill, the rough/paddy rice would be processed to remove the hull, and 
bran. Because the hull, and bran have mass, the resulting mass of rice would be <100 kg. In the 
United States (U.S.) the rice futures market is traded on an average of 70% milled rice, so the 
milled rice yield (MRY) would be 70 kg for this example. Of this 70 kg of remaining mass, some 
kernels would stay intact and some would break during the milling process. In the U.S., the rice 
futures market is traded assuming that 55% of the initial mass is whole kernels (HRY). Thus, in 
this example, there would be 55 kg of head rice for a HRY of 55%. The difference between MRY 
and HRY is the percentage of the initial mass that are broken kernels. Thus, 15% (in this case 15 
kg) would be broken rice (70%-55%). In the United States rice is traded at a benchmark of 15% 
brokens. In some countries, (oddly enough, mostly low-income) like Haiti and Nigeria the 
imported broken percentage is under five percent. It is likely that consumers in Haiti would 
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consume rice with over five percent brokens but it is not allowed to be imported. In Nigeria, 
despite a documented preference for imported rice, the extreme tariffs, as high as 110%, can 
prevent the consumption of the preferred imported rice (“US International Trade Commission”, 
2015; Lancon and Benz, 2007). Importantly, it is worth noting that brokens are a function of 
genetics, growing environment, and milling technology, eliminating or reducing broken rice is a 
difficult process for rice breeders and millers.  
In U.S. rice production some brokens are exported, most are used domestically, in the 
form of flour, or in pet foods for a lower value because of strict quality standards set by 
importing countries. In the U.S., brokens are valued at 60% of the value of whole kernels and 
are valued lower than that in many Asian countries (Lyman et al., 2013). Selling rice for a lower 
value domestically and diverting food intended for human consumption to animal 
consumption, creates welfare losses when other export markets exist that could be indifferent 
to visual qualities, specifically low-income countries. Market failures could exist in countries 
where there are strict import quality standards if consumers in those countries would be 
willing-to-pay for lower quality rice. This is especially true in low-income countries where the 
poorest of the poor maybe able to enter the rice market if its quality attributes are 
appropriately segregated and labeled.   
6.1.2. Chalky Rice  
Visual characteristics of rice grains are important search attributes that affect 
consumers’ purchasing decisions, specifically in open bag settings, and are used as some of the 
first selection criteria in rice breeding programs (Cuevas et al., 2016). Chalky areas in rice grains, 
the opaque white parts of the grains, are deemed, generally, to represent poor quality in many 
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rice market segments and thus can result in lower prices and demand (Fitzgerald and 
Resurreccion, 2009). Chalky areas in rice grains are caused by loose packing or incomplete filling 
of starch granules (Singh et al., 2003). The presence of chalk weakens the grain, leading to 
elevated incidence of breakage during the milling process and ultimately to reduced head rice 
yield, thus increased brokens. Like broken rice, chalk is a difficult attribute for breeders to 
eliminate as it’s a function of the genotype, the environment (specifically, hot nights (Lyman et 
al., 2013; Lanning et al., 2010)) and genotype by environment interactions.  
6.1.3. Rice Length and Width 
Based on its length, rice is commonly classified as short (< 5.5 mm), medium (5.51–6.6 mm), 
long (6.61–7.5 mm) and extra-long (>7.51 mm) (Khush et al., 1978), while other standards, such 
as the international CODEX and the European Union classify a kernel of 6 mm. or more as long 
grain (Commission, 2003). Rice is commonly classified by grain shape (length/width) into bold 
(<2), medium (2 – 3), and slender (>3) (Calingacion et al., 2014). Grain length and shape 
(length/width) are intrinsic attributes valued differently by consumers across markets. For 
instance, consumers in parts of South East Asia such as Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Malaysia, 
and Philippines prefer long and slender grains, while consumers in Indonesia and Bangladesh 
prefer medium and slender rice. Consumers in North Asia (Japan, South Korea, Northern China, 
and Taiwan) prefer short and bold rice, whereas extra-long grain is preferred among consumers 
in Pakistan and Northwestern India (Calingacion et al.,2014). 
Most countries have specifications for rice commercialization and trade that explicitly or 
implicitly include requirements about length and shape. For example, Iraq, the 9th largest 
importer of rice with an average of 1.1 million metric tons annually in the last 5 years, explicitly 
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requires a minimum average kernel length of 6.6 mm before cooking (“PS&D”, 2020). The 
standard for milled rice in the East African Community, which includes Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, 
South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, classifies rice into long grain, medium grain, short grain, 
and mixes following international significant standards such as CODEX.    
6.2. Rice in Africa 
By studying three different countries, this study hopes to examine rice markets in 
different contexts. This section describes the current rice market and previously documented 
rice preferences for DRC, Mozambique, and Ghana.  
6.2.1. The Democratic Republic of the Congo 
The DRC remains among the poorest countries in the world, ranking 186 out of 192 
reporting countries using GDP per capita (PPP) in 2018 according to the International Monetary 
Fund (“IMF”, 2020). From 1999 to 2019 rice consumption increased from 211,000 MT to 
402,000 MT (“FAOSTAT”, 2020). During that time the 90% increase in rice consumption 
outpaced population growth, which grew 83%, indicating rice consumption per capita increased 
(“FAOSTAT”, 2020).  Rice imports increased from 1,000 MT to 150,000 MT over the same time 
period (“FAOSTAT”, 2020). In 2018, DRC had the fourth highest annual population growth rate, 
at 3.25% in Sub-Saharan Africa (“World Bank”, 2020). To our knowledge, no one has examined 
consumer preference in the DRC, a country without quality import limitations. The government 
of DRC began the process of writing their National Rice Development Strategy (NRDS) in 2019 
and is still working on a final framework. Studies like this can provide important information to 
that process.  
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6.2.2. Mozambique  
While a poor nation, annual per capita rice consumption in Mozambique more than 
doubled from 8 kg in 2000 to 21 kg in 2007 and increased to 32kg in 2020 (Ines and Wase, 2016; 
Alhassan et al., 2016). Mozambique is a relatively large producer of rice but 90% of production 
is for home consumption with only 10% being marketed. Given this and the fact that 
Mozambique is a coastal country with several deep-water ports, imported rice dominates local 
markets. Like DRC, Mozambique has a large population growth rate, 2.9% annually, the sixth 
highest in sub-Saharan Africa (“World Bank”, 2020). 
The 2009 National Rice Development Strategy from the government of Mozambique is 
one of the few studies that mention consumer preference for rice in Mozambique. The study 
states that preferences include; medium to long grain; translucent (a proxy for non-chalky), 
intermediate amylase, non-sticky, with no ordering of preferences given. The same report also 
states, “Recognized to be internally weak, the grades and standards system in Mozambique is 
yet to become an important tool for both domestic [rice] production and consumption.” Given 
the Mozambican governments own admission that standards and grading are weak for rice 
marketing, studies like this are important to see if pricing of rice is affected by these lack of 
standards.  
6.2.3. Ghana  
Rice consumption in Ghana has quadrupled over the last 60 years with the majority of 
this increased demand met via imports from Vietnam, China, Thailand and the U.S. Domestic. 
Ghanaian rice has struggled to compete with imported rice largely due to the perceived low 
quality of domestic rice by consumers (Ayeduvor, 2018). Alhassan et al. (2016) found that 
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Ghanaian consumers reported the physical appearance of rice, when it is sold, as the most 
important purchasing attribute affecting consumer-purchasing behavior.  Similarly, Singh 
Ehiakpor et al. (Singh et al., 2003) found that the three most important attributes that 
Ghanaian consumers look for when purchasing rice are search attributes; good looking grains, 
how clean the rice looks and packaging. The authors found that the credence attributes of taste 
and texture were fourth and fifth, respectively. These studies show that in Ghana the physical 
appearance of rice and other search attributes largely drive rice purchases. This should not be a 
surprise given the predominance of the open bag marketing system in Ghana, consumers look 
for which rice “appears” the best.  
Demont et al. (2013) argued that urban consumers in coastal countries, like Ghana, are 
typically more susceptible to developing food preference biased towards imported rice. Many 
West African countries, led by Nigeria but including Ghana, are making a concerted effort to 
increase domestic production. One large issue is that if production increases but processing 
infrastructure are not able to ensure minimal quality standards (specifically the percentage of 
brokens), increased production volumes will quickly saturate local markets and erode domestic 
prices (Demont et al., 2013; Demont and Rizzotto, 2012). In a study of 11 African rice markets, 
Demont and Ndour (2015) found that that domestic rice could compete with imported rice in 
urban markets if its intrinsic and extrinsic quality attributes are better tailored to urban 
consumer preferences. 
Unlike in DRC and Mozambique, parboiled rice is prevalent across Ghana. Parboiling is a 
steam treatment of paddy rice that alleviates the effects of poor drying (fissuring of the kernel) 
and improves some aspects of search variables in rice as it reduces the proportion of broken 
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kernels. Parboiling can be associated with some visual and taste disadvantages, as it is more 
yellow in color and has a stronger flavor than non-parboiled rice (Gariboldi, 1974). Tomlins et 
al. (2005) found that local parboiled rice in Ghana is of relatively poor quality and Ghanaian 
consumers preferred imported rice and local non-parboiled rice to parboiled rice. Many West 
African governments promote parboiled rice because it can improve locally produced grain 
quality (through reduced broken percentage) and the parboiling process increases the water-





6.3 Models by Country   
Appendix Table 1 Democratic Republic of the Congo Models 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



























































        
R2 0.272 0.279 0.235 0.088 0.279 0.272 0.279 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
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Appendix Table 2 Mozambican Models 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 































Width 1.746** [0.775] 
2.251***   
[0.658] 
2.427*** 
























        
R2 0.204 0.375 0.377 0.333 0.396 0.3771 0.416 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
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Appendix Table 3 Ghanaian Pooled (Domestic and Imported) Models 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






































































Chalky (%) -0.001 [0.001] 
- 




















        
R2 0.256 0.252 0.293 0.259 0.253 0.295 0.304 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
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Appendix Table 4 Ghanaian Imported Models 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 







































































Chalky (%) -0.001* (0.001) 
- 




















        
R2 0.211 0.180 0.229 0.205 0.213 0.239 0.233 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
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Appendix Table 5 Ghanaian Domestic Models 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






































































Chalky (%) 0.0002 [0.001] 
- 





















        
R2 0.297 0.322 0.343 0.334 0.308 0.343 0.363 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  




Appendix Table 6 Democratic Republic of the Congo Models with Market Fixed Effects 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




















































































































































































        
R2 0.447 0.434 0.415 0.350 0.320 0.447 0.435 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 
        
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
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Appendix Table 7 Mozambican Models with Market Fixed Effects  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 




































































































































































        
R2 0.267 0.429 0.451 0.391 0.448 0.451 0.481 
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112 112 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
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Appendix Table 8 Ghanaian Models with Market Fixed Effects  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






































































Chalky (%) -0.001 [0.001] 
- 
































































































































































































        
R2 0.435 0.445 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.477 0.499 
Observations 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
***,**,* denote P<0.01, P<0.05 and P<0.1, respectively.  
[] denote, robust standard errors, and () represent non-robust standard errors.  
